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Inse will likely compromise T he notion that the logic of industrialism (Kerr et al. 1960) wouldlead to a convergence of industrial relations systems has been sweptaside by history. Nonetheless, in addition to political regimes and
market pressures, industrialization is still regarded as a central variable in
explaining industrial relations policies or transformations in industrial
relations systems. The argument that stages or levels of industrialization
are correlated with certain patterns of industrial relations and trade union
influence has received particular attention. For instance, Frenkel (ed.,
1993) suggests that, in the most general terms, it appears that a country's
level of industrialization is related to the influence trade unions have in
shaping workplace industrialization. In Frenkel's nine-country sruc4r, the
least industrialized countries-Malaysia, Thailand, and China-show less
trade union influence in workplace industrial relations than the more
developed countries, such as Singapore. Frenkel contends, however, that it
is simplistic to assume that industrial relations systems in countries at
similar levels of industrialization ought to be similar, given the variation
in patterns of industrialization across the four "Asian tigers," which are at
similar levels of industrialization.
M. Bjorkman, 1. Lauridsen, and H. Marcussen (1988) hypothesize that
different patterns of industrialization are associated with different kinds of
capital-labor relations. Their theoretical work suggests little or no relation-
ship between capital-labor relations and two levels of import-substitution
industrialization (simple and advanced). They argue that simple export-
oriented industrialization, based on labor-intensive production, is associ-
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ated with a highly repressive labor system, while more advanced forms of
export-oriented industrialization, based on capital-intensive production
systems and that rely on highly skilled labor, are likely to result in more
inclusive and less repressive industrial relations systems. In their scheme,
different forms of industrialization reflect the nature of different forms of
capital accumulation, which translate into different kinds of capital-labor
relations, an argument Sharma (1985) also advanced.! Empirical tests of
their propositions have yet to be conducted, however. Deyo (1989) aiso
finds policies of labor suppression by East Asian states consequent to
export-oriented industrialization. 2
Somewhat related to this argument is the suggestion of the new
international division of labor (NIDI) theorists that industrialization has
been thrust upon peripheral societies by core economic powers and that
this industrialization, through the transmission belt of global multination-
als and condoning local governments, has led to union repression and
marginalization in peripheral societies. Frenkel (ed., 1993) does not find
this hypothesis to be supported in his study, although he suggests that
further research is necessary in this regard.
What is missing from this literature is a closely reasoned argument
about how industrialization strategies affect the actions of management,
labor, and government in the labor relations sphere. More specifically,
what factors lead governments to decide on a specific industrialization
strategy? What implications does the choice of such a strategy have for
the industrial relations (IR) system and, specifically, the instirutional
arrangements governing labor relations? The institutional arrangements in
particular are central to the way in which the industrial relations policies
of the state and the industrial relations practices of the actors develop and
change. A focus on rules and laws is not enough. Previous literature has,
by and large, ignored these arrangements. Instead, they have concentrated
on broader typologies ofIR systems, such as "collaborative-repressive."
In this chapter, a different view is taken of the relationship between
industrialization strategies and industrial relations policy and practice. I
argue that it is not the logic of industrialism or the levels of industrializa-
tion per se but the choice of an industrialization strategy and the shifts
between such strategies that influence changes in industrial relations
policies. Different industrialization strategies exist, such as import-substi-
tution, export-oriented, basic industries, and small-scale strategies, each
with its attendant implications for industrial relations policies. The argu-
ment developed here is that it is the shift from one strategy to another
that is important in understanding transformations in industrial relations
systems (i.e., these shifts provide a window through which to assess the
dynamics of change in industrial relations systems).
It is not my intent to suggest that the changes in industrial relations
policies are solely determined by shifts in the industrialization strategy.
Other factors, such as change
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Other factors, such as changes in political regimes, are often critical reasons
industrial relations systems change, as demonstrated by Collier and Collier
(1991) for Latin America and suggested by various others (e.g., Frenkel,
ed., 1993; Bjorkman, Lauridsen, and Marcussen 1988). It is important to
note, however, that the relative importance of various factors differs from
country to country. In the countries of East Asia and Southeast Asia, whose
industrialization experiences are relatively recent and largely successful and
whose political regimes, with the exception of Thailand, have been
relatively stable, the variables related to industrialization may have stronger
explanatory power than those related to politics.
Nor do I argue that the type of industrialization strategy that a country
pursues is deterministic (i.e., a change from strategy X will lead to
industrial relations systems type Y). Rather, I argue that the shift from
one strategy to another provides a rare "moment in the transition" of
economies that enables researchers to view the dynamics of industrial
relations transformation. The particular pressures and the direction of
change in an IR system are necessarily specific to each country, but in the
context of the NICs of Southeast Asia, the shifts in industrialization
strategies could provide a general framework for the analysis of IR
system change. Implicit in this argument is the notion that certain
industrialization strategies tend to be associated with, and to sustain,
certain industrial relations policies and practices.
In this chapter, Malaysia is used as an example to examine this
"moment in transition" in an industrial relations system. In Malaysia,
industrialization strategies were largely a function of the ethnic tensions
and the economic results of policies introduced to manage these tensions. I
argue that the shift from an import-substitution policy to an export-
oriented policy resulted in an increasingly inflexible and government-
dominated industrial relations system. In assessing the dynamics of change
in the industrial relations system, three factors appear important. These
include the demands of the industrialization strategy itself (EOI, based on
low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing), the state's dependence on foreign
investment to sustain this strategy, and the state's need to increase the
economic efficiency of state-run plants, all of which constituted pressures
for change in industrial relations.
Although the focus is on Malaysia, the argument is equally applicable
to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand (Kuruvilla 1992), as well as to
other Third World countries that are under pressure to restructure their
economies (Katz, Kuruvilla, and Turner forthcoming; Singh 1992). The
next section briefly describes the Malaysian economy, including previous
and current state industrialization strategies. I then discuss industrial
relations strategies. This is followed by an analysis of the outcomes of
Malaysia's industrial relations policy. The final section provides some
concluding observations and notes several implications for further research.
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Malaysia's Economy Today Table 3.1. 5ummary of the Ma
Malaysia is one of the fastest growing economies in the world and in
many ways a Third World success story. Twenty years of sustained
growth and diversification have reduced the economy's reliance on primary
products, such as tin and rubber. Malaysia is still the world's largest
exporter of tin and rubber, however, the largest exporter of palm oil, and
a significant producer of oil, natural gas, and timber. More recently, it has
become one of the largest manufacturers of semiconductors and a sizable
manufacturer of electronics, electrical products, and textiles. Exports
account for about 61 percent of gross national product (GNP), which
makes the economy very dependent on the external economic climate.
Although growth was slowed during 1982 and 1985-86 as a result of
falling prices in commodities, Malaysia has sustained high economic
growth since then through its booming export trade in manufacturing,
which is driven primarily by foreign investment. Industry has supplanted
agriculrure as the major contributor to gross domestic product, accounting
for 42 percent of GDP, and low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing
accounts for about 48 percent of export earnings. In the last few years,
Malaysia's GDP has grown at an average annual rate of 8.7 percent,
making it among the highest in the world, and manufacturing has grown
at about 15 percent annually. National and per capita incomes are
increasing at a rate of 7 percent annually, and the per capita income-about
U.S.$2,000-is higher than the per capita incomes of most Third World
countries.
Foreign investment in Malaysia continues to increase, attracted by the
favorable investment policies, the cheap, docile, and skilled labor, and the
well-developed infrastrucrure (Malaysia has 30,000 kilometers of paved
roads, reliable and efficient telecommunications, cheap and abundant
electricity, and efficient transportation systems). Foreign investment is still
dominated by low-cost, labor-intensive industries, although a small shift
to more higher-technology production is apparent and the country has
begun attracting more larger companies. Japan is the largest investor,
closely followed by Taiwan, which alone accounts for 25 percent of the
total foreign direct investment and the largest number of projects. Indus-
trial relations in Malaysia have recently been characterized as becoming
highly repressive and trade unions as weak, excluded by the government
in decision making at national levels, and having very little influence at
the workplace level (Arudsothy and Littler 1993). Table 3.1 provides basic
economic statistics.
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Table 3.1. Summary of the Malaysian Economy, 1990
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Before its independence from Great Britain in 1957, Malaysia was
dependent on exports of primary commodities, and tin and rubber produc-
tion accounted for 85 percent of export earnings and 48 percent of GDP.
Agriculture, mining, banking, and external trade were controlled by
foreign interests (mostly British), while small-scale industry was owned
largely by ethnic Chinese and Indians.3 Ethnic Malays were concentrated
largely in the rural agricultural sectors. Although they accounted for 50
percent of the population, they owned less than 10 percent of the registered
businesses and less than 1.5 percent of the share capital and paid less than
4 percent of the nation's income tax. At independence, the industrial
strategy, relied primarily on the processing of raw materials for export.
ysta
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Import-Substitution Industrialization
Market-Led ISI. Economic policy in 1957-70 focused on the state's
involvement in the development of an infrastructure and the rural sector
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(which accounted for 30 percent of planned expenditures), while industrial-
ization was left to the private sector. The state restricted itself to the
creation of a favorable climate to attract foreign investment in import-
substitution industries. Among the state initiatives during this period was
the enactment of the Pioneer Industries Relief from Income Tax Ordinance
of 1958 and the creation of the Malaysian Industrial Development Finance
Corporation, which was responsible for providing investment capital and
for the development of industrial estates. After the 1968 withdrawal of
Singapore from the Federation of Malaya, the Investment Incentives Act
was introduced, aimed at stimulating industrial growth by attracting
foreign investment with a plethora of tax concessions, enhancing the
Pioneer status conditions, and creating free trade zones. (For a detailed
description of specific policies, see Spinanger 1986.)
The decision to leave industrial investment to the private sector was
largely a political compromise reached between the parties making up the
ruling alliance (Bowie 1991). The United Malay National Organization
(UMNO) realized that Chinese and Indian acceptance of the UMNO's
political role was to some extent dependent on the state's not interfering
in private commerce and industry (which they dominated) beyond its
regulatory role. The UMNO therefore accepted (temporarily) the Chinese
and Indian dominance of business and commerce, in exchange for their
acceptance of UMNO political domination and UMNO efforts to increase
Malay participation in the rural sector and in transportation, mining,
construction, and timber industries. World Bank recommendations favor-
ing industrialization under private sector auspices also influenced this
policy (Spinanger 1986; Bowie 1991).
The strategy had mixed results. On the one hand, by 1969, Malaysia's
economy had grown by more than 5 percent per year, manufacturing
growth rates were high, at 10.2 percent annually, and private investment
had increased by 7.3 percent annually. The fastest growing industries were
textiles, electrical machinery, and motor vehicle assembly. On the other
hand, the participation of the ethnic Malays in this economic growth was
limited. Ownership among Malays still remained static, at 1.5 to 2
percent, while the share among the Chinese and Indians grew somewhat. 4
Malay participation in manufacturing employment had increased only
marginally and was much lower in skilled and managerial jobs.
It became clear that the market-led approach succeeded in strengthening
the economic position of the Chinese and Indians, relative to the Malays,
and anger over this outcome was responsible for the communal violence
after the 1969 parliamentary elections (Bowie 1991; Lim and Pang Eng
Fong 1991). The relative economic stagnation of the Malays resulted in
Malaysian politics becoming increasingly polarized on ethnic lines during
this period (Bowie 1991).
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C. The NEP, promulgated in
response to Malay nationalism, was designed to increase the ethnic distri-
bution of the work force in proportion to the ethnic distribution of the
population and to increase the bhumiputras' ("sons of the soil")--that is,
the Malays'-share of corporate ownership from 2.4 percent, in 1970, to
30 percent by 1990. The strategy emphasized redistribution via growth in
output and employment. In operational terms, employment quotas of 30
percent for Malays were a prerequisite for firms to qualify for import
protection and tax concessions. Government contracts were reserved for
Malay-owned firms, and all firms had to keep aside 30 percent of their
shares for Malays.
Arguing that economic growth would "increase the size of the pie," the
UMNO was able to convince its Chinese and Indian counterparts in the
ruling alliance that the empowerment of the Malays would not detrimen-
tally affect Chinese and Indian interests. To ensure the levels of growth
required, the state, for the first time, became a significant actor in ISI
investment. State intervention was justified on the grounds that Malays
did not currently possess the wealth or the entrepreneurial ability to start
new businesses. The UMNO's investments in the private sector were
therefore to be made on behalf of Malay interests and would ultimately
pass to Malay hands.
Although these policies resulted in increasing the economic participation
of Malays (their share of total manufacturing employment increased to 32
percent, while the percentage of Malays in managerial positions rose to 17
percent and their ownership share to about 8 percent [Bowie 1991}), they
were still short of Malay nationalists' expectations. There were not enough
qualified. Malays to meet the 30 percent employment target in eachfirm,
and the policies did not result in the development of entrepreneurship.
Industry continued to be dominated by ethnic Chinese. Bowie (1991)
notes an increase in "Ali-Baba"-type ventures in which Malay businessmen
acted as "fronts" for Chinese capital.
Citing the failure of the policies to increase the Malays' participation
significantly, and under pressure from Malay nationalists, the state intensi-
fied its investment in ISI by enacting the Industrial Coordination Act
(lCA) of 1976, which gave the Ministry of Trade and Industry complete
powers to direct and control the development of industry, including the
power to issue licenses to industries based on their compliance with NEP
goals. The Bhumiputra Investment Fund was created with state funds for
the purpose of investing in shares on behalf of Malays, and the ICA
mandated majority share ownership by Malays in all joint ventures and
foreign projects. Also during this phase, the Petroleum Development Act
of 1976 was enacted, which enabled the government to acquire control
over the petroleum and petrochemical industries without compensation
(Bowie 1991; Lim and Pang Eng Fong 1991).
.
The economic implications of state intervention were far-reaching. For
nditures), while industrial-
ate restricted itself to the
.gn investment in import-
ives during this period was
rom Income Tax Ordinance
,trial Development Finance
ing investment capital and
er the 1968 withdrawal of
Investment Incentives Act
trial growth by attracting
:oncessions, enhancing the
rade zones. (For a detailed
)86.)
t to the private sector was
1 the parties making up the
alay National Organization
.cceptance of the UMNO's
n the state's not interfering
ley dominated) beyond its
d (temporarily) the Chinese
terce, in exchange for their
1 UMNO efforts to increase
in transportation, mining,
!Ok recommendations favor-
lSpices also influenced this
~hand, by 1969, Malaysia's
It per year, manufacturing
ally, and private investment
test growing industries were
icle assembly. On the other
n this economic growth was
nainedstatic, at 1.5 to 2
nd Indians grew somewhat. 4
oyment had increased only
managerial jobs.
h succeeded in strengthening
lians, relative to the Malays,
: for the communal violence
.e 1991; Lim and Pang Eng
)0 of the Malays resulted in
uized on ethnic lines during
~~~",,~~-~§t~lfi~}~
....
44 Sarosh Kuruvilla lndustrial R
the first time since independence, the Malaysian state exerted increasing
control over the private sector via regulation and direct investment in the
furtherance of NEP goals. Government revenues poured into NEP and
ICA policies, assuming that private sector investment would continue as
before. Private and foreign investment balked at investing, however, given
the NEP and ICA policies and fears of nationalization. Consequently, levels
of private sector investment fell dramatically, from expected levels of 12 to
14 percent to about 3 percent of GDP in 1976. This shortfall, and the
utilization of government funds to buy shares (undersubscribed by the
Malay business community for which they were reserved) resulted in a
major resource crunch, which led to increased borrowing from international
banks. Foreign debt as a percentage of GNP increased from 8.45 percent
in 1975 to almost 11 percent by 1976-77.
Transition to Export-Oriented Industrialization
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The resource crunch drove the government to articulate a mixed policy.
On the one hand, the government launched a massive campaign to
encourage private and foreign investment during the 1977-80 period.
Policies emphasized investment incentives, the development of infrastruc-
rural facilities, and numerous tax, labor, and other incentives. (Spinanger
1986 and Lim and Pang Eng Fong 1991 discuss these in greater detail.)
Electronics and textile industries were specifically targeted. Foreign compa-
nies manufacturing for export were exempted from the ICA policies on
Malay share ownership, and labor laws that might have discouraged foreign
investment were relaxed or went unenforced. Unions were excluded from
key industries and the export sector. This new phase saw the beginnings
of massive foreign investment in the electronics sector by U.S. and
Japanese companies.
On the other hand, the state increased its involvement in the develop-
ment of heavy import-substituting industries. The continued failure of
state-led NEP and ICA policies to achieve economic power for Malays
commensurate with their distribution in the population (Malays owned
only 12.4 percent of corporate wealth in 1978, and the target of 30 percent
ownership by 1990 appeared out of reach) led to further pressures from
Malay nationalists to increase ownership by Malays (Bowie 1991).
In response, in 1980, Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, the then-industries
minister, announced a heavy industries policy (HIP) geared to achieving
the twin objectives of accelerating industrial growth and improving the
economic position of Malays. Through the Heavy Industries Corporation
(HIC), the state now had a leading role in establishing large-scale, capital-
intensive, import-substituting industries to provide industrial goods and
consumer durables for the domestic market and a foundation to support a
range of private sector and consumer goods industries. The HIC invested
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in a series of large-scale joint ventures, including PROTON (Malaysian
Small Car Project), iron and steel works at Trengganu, and plants for
cement, motorcycles, aluminum, and gas, of which were Japanese private
sector firms with about 30 percent investment from the government. 5
The outpouring of government revenues to sustain the NEP and ICA
policies, combined with the recessions of 1982 and 1985 and the draining
of revenues by the heavy industries program, drove Malaysia's external
debt to unprecedented levels (Lim and Pang Eng Fong 1991). By 1986,
debt as a percentage of GNP had tripled, bringing it to 30 percent, over
1976 levels. Foreign borrowing became the primary source of foreign
capital inflow in the first half of the 1980s. The poor performance of the
HIC contributed further to the revenue crunch. Thus, by 1987, the HIC
had reported losses exceeding U. S. $100 million, total state liabilities
exceeded U.S.$2.24 billion, and 37 percent of the public debt was the
result of government-backed foreign loans.
Given this second "resource" crunch, and under pressure from the World
Bank and other lending agencies, Malaysia announced.a series of austerity
measures. In addition to cutbacks in public spending, these included the
privatization of various state-owned public sector industries. Further,
Malay managers in the state-owned heavy industries program were replaced
by more "professional" Japanese and private sector managers.
To meet its interest payments on foreign debts, the state also encouraged
export-oriented industries, simplifying bureaucratic controls, increasing
investment allowances and incentives, and reducing corporate and develop-
ment taxes. Clearly, the economic situation of the 1980s showed that the
state could not reconcile its heavy industries program and its NEP and ICA
programs with rapid industrial growth. The state came to be dependent on
foreign investment for the growth of its manufacturing sector and exports.
As a result, development priorities once again shifted to EOI from a policy
of heavy industrialization for an increasingly protected domestic market.
Since 1989, favorable external factors, dramatic increases in foreign invest-
ment, and growth in exports of manufactUred goods have stimulated
economic growth.
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Outcomes of Export-Oriented Strategy
The description above suggests that during 1977 and then during 1988
it was the shortage of revenues brought about by the government's
involvement in NEP, ICA, and the HIP, and the consequent increases in
international debt, that brought about the shift to EOI policies. The shift
from an import-substitution strategy to a more export-oriented strategy
transformed the Malaysian economy in several ways.
First, foreign direct investment in Malaysia has grown dramatically
since 1987. In 1989, total direct foreign investment in Malaysia exceeded
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U.S.$1.86 billion, representing a 157 percent increase over the previous
year (investment increased by 127 percent between 1987 and 1988) and
accounting for roughly 12 percent of GDP. In the first half of 1989,
foreign enterprises accounted for 80 percent of the proposed equity
investment in the country. Eighty-five percent of these investments were
in export-oriented industries.
Second, the origins of investment have changed substantially over, the
1980-90 period. Although the United States was the largest investor, its
position was rapidly supplanted by Japan and then by the Asian NICs.
The majority of these investments are in 100-percent-foreign-owned firms.
Third, the locus of investment (and particularly investment from the
NICs) is primarily in the low-cost, labor-intensive, export-oriented manu-
facturing sector, although recently there has been an increase in the
number of small and medium-sized firms from Japan oriented toward more
high-skill-based manufacture. Nearly 85 percent of approved manufactur-
ing investors for 1988 were committed to export at least half their
production, compared with 25 percent for the 1982-86 period. The three
industries now receiving the largest amount of foreign investment funds
are electronics and electrical products, textiles, and chemicals, which
export 98 percent of their production.
Fourth, the total manufacturing sector now accounts for 32 percent of
employment, 42 percent of GDP, and 40 percent of export earnings.
Manufacturing exports have grown by an average of 15 percent annually
since 1988 and account for more than half of export earnings. Within
this sector, the contribution of low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturers
increased from 29 percent of production and export earnings in 1980 to 51
percent in 1988 (Ariff and Hill 1985; Tyers, Phillips, and Findlay 1987).
The contribution of export processing zones (characterized by labor-
intensive production, which contributes to employment creation but little
to government revenues) to total exports exceeded 33 percent in 1988
(Ariff and Hill 1985; Tyers, Phillips, and Findlay 1987). Finally, the
contribution of transnational corporations to exports has increased from 28
percent of exports in 1971 to 58 percent in 1988 (Tyers, Phillips, and
Findlay 1987).
Fifth, the electronics industry has been the centerpiece of this dramatic
economic performance. The importance of semiconductors to Malaysia's
economy is well known. The electronics industry, specifically manufactur-
ers of semiconductors, employs 16.7 percent of the manufacturing work
force (Onn 1989). Total exports of semiconductors exceeded M$4 billion,
accounting for 24.8 percent of total manufacturing exports in 1989
(Grace 1990). A 1987 United Nations report (United Nations Centre on
Transnational Corporations 1987) shows that the majority of foreign
(mostly American- and Japanese-owned) plants in the electronics industry
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wafer fabrication plants have been established since 1992.
In sum, although Malaysia's economic transformation has resulted in
impressive growth rates, the EOI strategy has made the country dependent
on low-cost, labor-intensive, foreign-dominated manufacturing for export
to meet interest payments and sustain industrial growth. The dependence
on this form of EOI has forced the Malaysian government to continue to
enact policies geared toward attracting and retaining foreign capital to its
low-cost export sector. As the next sections will indicate, this transforma-
tion has affected labor relations policy significantly.
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,Industrial Relations Policy under 151: Restricted Pluralism
This section briefly describes industrial relations policy during the
import-substitution period, from the 1950s to about 1977. The central
pieces of legislation in the industrial relations sphere included the Employ-
ment Act of 1955, the Trade Unions Ordinance of 1959, and the Industrial
Relations Act of 1967. The principle that the government followed was
essentially one of pluralism, based on the belief that workers required some
degree of fair and humane treatment but also reflecting the view that
economic development goals had supremacy over unfettered trade union
rights (Bot 1988). The Employment Act focused on legislating fair
conditions of work. Although collective bargaining was the primary form
for resolving industrial problems, unions were controlled through the
union registration process.
Any seven persons could form a union, but the registrar of trade
unions had wide discretionary powers in according registration, canceling
registration if two or more unions catered to any sector of the work force,
or for any other reason and in determining the nature of the bargaining
unit. The registrar also had the power to exclude particular individuals
from union activity. Although the principle of one union per occupation
within an industry should have strengthened the power of unions, P.
Arudsothy (1990) suggests that it was used primarily to weed out those
unions that were most militant. Unions were allowed to affiliate themselves
with peak federations; however, the registrar had the power to withhold
permission to do so. In general, the principle followed was that permission
to affiliate would be granted if the registrar was convinced that the purpose
of affiliation was not for trade union purposes. Peak federations, such as
the Malaysian Trade Union Congress (MTUC), were incorporated as
societies. This policy was selectively used to ensure that the state exercised
control over the growth and character of the labor movement.
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Consistent with the notion of the supremacy of economic development
goals, the subjects of collective bargaining were restricted. Unions were
not permitted to bargain on issues relating to management decisions
with respect to recruitment, promotions, transfers, job assignments, or
termination of employment on account of dismissals or retrenchment.
To encourage foreign investment, under the Pioneer Industries ordi-
nance, the state guaranteed that the terms and conditions negotiated with
unions were not more favorable than the provisions of the Employment
Act of 1955. Strikes were allowed, subject to various restrictions: notice
had to be given, a strike ballot had to be taken, and the ballot results had
to be registered with the registrar within seven days. The registrar then
had ninety days to check the validity of the ballot results. In addition,
under the Industrial Relations Act of 1967, strikes were prohibited once
the dispute had been referred to arbitration by the minister of labor.
Conciliation was invariably the first option available to the parties to
settle a dispute (Khan 1989). If conciliation was not reached, the dispute
could be referred to binding arbitration by the minister of labor in the
Industrial Court, after a joint application was submitted from the parties
or on the minister's own initiative. The court, in making its award, was
required to "have regard for the public interest, the financial implications,
and the effect of the award on the country, the industry concerned and also
to the probable effect on similar industries" (Ayadurai 1990). Furthermore,
all collective bargaining agreements had to be "cognized" (certified) by the
Industrial Court. The court had the power to refuse to cognize if the
agreement contained provisions that were deemed not to be in the
national interest.
Even under an import-substitution industrialization strategy, one could
argue that the Malaysian system of industrial relations in the private sector
was closely controlled by the state, the freedom of unions to organize and
to bargain was severely restricted, and the industrial relations rules and
regulations clearly reflected the state's efforts to contain industrial conflict
in the interests of economic development. The prohibition on political
strikes and the restrictions on the ability of peak bodies to carry out trade
union functions also ensured that unions would not constitute a significant
opposition to the government.
The nature of IR policy reflects a "controlled pluralism" during this
period. Despite the considerable powers given to the state in industrial
relations matters (Arudsothy and Littler 1993), the state's intervention, in
terms of administrative practice, was relatively minimal.
Industrial Relations Policy under EOI: Repression, Exclusion,
and Cost Containment
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and foreign investors. First, the dependence on low-cost, labor-intensive
manufacturing for export forced the government to enact policies that kept
costs low, so as to preserve Malaysia's competitive advantage in having
cheap and disciplined labor and 'thereby continue to attract foreign invest-
ment.6 Naturally, the manufacturing and export sectors were the target of
these policies. Second, the state increased its involvement in the industrial
relations sphere to a considerable extent, moving from controlled pluralism
to repression. The increase in repression reflected the state's need to
increase the economic efficiency and productivity of state-owned enterprises
and to sustain the EOI strategy. The specific mechanisms through which
this shift was accomplished are described below.
Several rules and regulations directly affecting the competitive position
of Malaysian exports were introduced. First, the minister oflabor extended
the tax and labor-exempt policies for Pioneer industries and industries in
export processing zones (EPZs). Collective bargaining in this sector is
circumscribed to the extent that the terms and conditions of employment
may not be better than those defined under Part XII of the Employment
Ordinance of 1955. Since there is no minimum wage legislation in
Malaysia (except for certain classes of employees determined regionally),
the Employment Act is concerned mainly with rates of pay for overtime,
leave, and holidays. Second, the government has repeatedly refused to
enact comprehensive minimum wage legislation, despite repeated demands
by trade unions.
Third, in 1988, the definition of wages for the calculation of overtime
was changed to reduce costs. Previously, wages for overtime included all
allowances and bonuses; it now excludes them (Pi'i and Kumaraguru
1989). In addition, the rate of overtime pay for working on days of rest
was reduced from three to two times hourly pay, and pay for working on
holidays was reduced from 4.5 to 3.5 times hourly pay. Although these
reductions may appear reasonable, because of the shortage of unskilled and
semiskilled labor in Malaysia (Arensman 1990), these reductions have
significant cost implications. Union leaders argue that this change was the
result of pressure from foreign electronics manufacturers located in Malaysia
who were concerned about maintaining their competitive COStadvantage
(Grace 1990).
Fourth, the refusal of the government to enact equal pay for equal work
is another example of its efforts to keep costs low to meet the demands of,
foreign companies (Grace 1990). Although females represent only 40
percent of the manufacturing work force, they account for more than 78.6
percent of the work force in the electronics industry. Arguably, this
explains why the electronics industry has been exempted from the provi-
sions of the Employment Act (1955), which forbade the employment of
women between the hours of 10 P.M. and 5 A.M. Support for the exemption
is evidenced by a 1988 amendment to the Employment Act, whereby the
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definition of days for maternity leave was changed to include holidays,
rather than excluding them (Grace 1990).
Fifth, the government has been willing to grant exemptions from labor
laws to foreign companies; for instance, in 1981, the government exempted
the INTEL Corporation from the provisions of the Employment Act of
1955 and allowed INTEL to work its employees continuously for sixteen
hours. More recently, the 1988 amendment to the Employment Act allo:ws
the director general of industrial relations to permit employers to work
their employees for more hours than stipulated by the act, up to a
maximum of forty-eight hours a week, giving considerably more flexibility
to employers.
Sixth, the state continued its exclusionary policy with regard to the
general banning of trade unions in the export sector. After intense pressure
was brought to bear by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the
International Metal Workers' Federation, and leaders of the American labor
movement (who unsuccessfully petitioned the U.S. government to revoke
Malaysia's General System of Preferences [GSP} status for noncompliance
with ILO conventions), the general ban was lifted in 1988.7 A partial ban
continues, however, in the form of a decision by the registrar that unions
in the electronics sector can operate only on an "in-house" basis. This
policy has circumscribed considerably the power of unions to organize. 8 E.
Grace (1990) finds that the ban was put into effect so as to appease U.S.-
based electronics manufactUrers that threatened to move production ours ide
the country.
Although in-house unions can now be organized in the electronics sector,
recent ourcomes in cases involving two factories that were subsidiaries of
multinational companies, Harris Semiconductors (United States) and the
Hitachi Group (Japan) (see Duthie 1990, Arensman 1990, and Barnard
1992 for details), make it abundantly clear that the right to organize exists
in theory but not in practice. For example, after the workers in the Harris
subsidiary won official recognition for their union in January 1990, the
company shifted most of its operations and workers to a nonunion
subsidiary. By April 1990, most of the workers had become nonunion,
and Malaysia's high court ruled against the workers' petition that the shift
was illegal. Currently, despite the existence of more than 140 companies
in the electronics sector, only two electronics unions exist.
The outcomes at Harris and Hitachi are examples of how foreign
corporations manipulate Malaysian trade union regulations to their advan-
tage. The MTUC alleges, for example, that the Malaysian American
Electronics Industry (MAEI), a trade gtoup representing American employ-
ers in Malaysia, has pressured the Malaysian government into restricting
workers' rights by threatening to close plants in Malaysia (Arensman
1990). The MTUC cites a letter written in 1986 to Malaysia's labor
ministry by an official at General InsttUment Corporation stating that "if
there is a union of any kind,
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mged to include holidays, there is a union of any kind, it is quite likely that GI corporate will sell
this optoelectronic business, and it may mean closing an off-shore plant in
Malaysia" (Arensman 1990:47). Although MAEI executives have denied
the allegations, it is clear that Malaysian workers in the electronics industry
face numerous obstacles to their right of freedom of association.
Although the evidence cited above supports the idea that foreign
manufacturers demanded a policy of union suppression, it must also be
remembered that the state has had a substantial interest in maintaining
the low-cost advantage that Malaysian exports enjoyed. Every change in
policy mentioned above reflects this objective.
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In addition to enacting various "cost-containment measures" for the
export sector, the government has systematically tightened labor rules and
regulations in general. Here the changes reflect an increased "activism" on
the part of the government, beginning with the onset of EOI in 1979-80
and continuing after EOI in 1988. Although I place more emphasis on
EOI as the primary reason for the increase in government intervention,
another significant factor has been the government's increased role as an
employer, given its involvement in the NEP, ICA, and heavy industries
program. One could argue that, given the poor performance of state-owned
industries, the governmenfs desire to promote economic efficiency has
contributed to its increased involvement in regulating unions. Support for
this argument can be seen in the changes in the government's policy
consequent to the Malaysian Airlines (MAS) strike of 1979.
Following that strike, the Industrial Relations Act was amended, first,
to give the minister of labor wide-ranging powers beyond the extensive
ones already available to him with respect to industrial relations issues,
including, most significantly, the power to declare any industry or service
"essential." This implied that unions could be disallowed in essential
services. Second, the minister was given the power to suspend a trade
union for six months if he felt that it was acting against the national
interest. Although the public sectOr MAS strike was the prime motivation
for this change in legislation, it cannot be overlooked that, with increasing
government intervention in industry as part of the NEP, ICA, and
heavy industries policy, the government itself has become a significant
shareholder in the private sector, with a direct interest in labor suppression
beyond its purely regulatory role. "Essential," therefore, has broad conno-
tations and can include airlines, food processing, electricals, road transpor-
tation, and any other industry deemed to be in the national interest.
The following examples are illustrative of the government's increased
intervention in the industrial relations sphere.
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Table 3.2. Union Recognition Claims in Malaysia, 1980-86
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
A II Industries
Total claims 125 149 119 112 169 224 224
Voluntary tecognition 54 74 59 38 51 3 7
Recognition accorded
by ministet 5 16 8 6 8 2 6
Recognition rejected
by minister 29 23 15 39 80 131
(Percent) (19.4) (19.3) (13.3) (23.0) (35.7) (58.4)
Manufacturing
Total claims 78 55 66 105 136 172
Voluntary recognition 44 26 25 30 26 20
Recognition accorded
by minister 4 5 5 5 2
Recognition rejected
by minister 12 13 7 26 62 98
(Percent) (15.3) (23.6) (10.6) (16.7) (45.5) (56.7)
Rejections in
manufacturing as
,..
percentage of total
rejections 41.3 56.5 46.6 66.6 77.5 74.8
Sources:Department of Industtial Relations. Kuala Lumpur, and Pehie, Mansour, and Chen 1988.
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1981
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89
35
54
11
2
Source: Compiled by the author from E
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Trade Union RecognitionClaims. Consistent with the more activist stance
of the government, the minister of labor's involvement in union recogni-
tion claims has been increasing. As table 3.2 indicates, his rate of rejection
of claims for recognition has increased, and the proportion of rejections to
total rejections in manufacturing has increased substantially. Under normal
circumstances, once a union is registered after meeting the stringent
requirements of the registrar of trade unions, it requests recognition by the
employer. If the employer does not voluntarily recognize the union (and
invariably the employer does not, as table 3.2 shows), the claim is sent to
the director general of industrial relations for investigation. The minister
of labor makes a final and binding decision on recognition. At least
half the recognition claims have been in the low-cost, labor-intensive
manufacturing areas of textiles and light electricals. This is where the
greatest number of recognition claims have been rejected by the minister,
although data are available only until 1986.
Government Intervention in Dispute Settlements. The activist stance of the
government is reflected in dispute settlements in two ways. First, the labor
minister has been far more willing to refer disputes on his own initiative
for binding arbitration to the Industrial Court. This effectively curtails
the operation of free collective bargaining. This practice has increased
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;a, 1980-86 Table 3.3. Number of Dispute Settlements in Malaysia in Which Labor Minister
)83 1984 1985 1986 Was Involved, 1981-86
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
12 169 224 224 No. of dispUtes 498 606 836 757 827 956
38 51 3 7 No. settled by
conciliation 398 538 741 602 666 675
6 8 2 6 No. referred to
industrial court
15 39 80 131 (total) 89 60 54 107 113 158
(13.3) (23.0) (35.7) (58.4) No. referred by joint
application of the
parties 35 32
"
15 20 34 44
66 105 136 172 No. referred by
25 30 26 20 minister on own
initiative 54 28 39 87 79 114
5 5 1 2 No. settled by minister 11 8 39 48 48 121
Percentage settled by
7 26 62 98 minister 2 4.6 6.34 5.80 12.68
(10.6) (16.7) (45.5) (56.7)
Source:Compiled by r-beaurhor from Bor 1988.
-
46.6 66.6 77.5 74.8
dramatically and at a much greater rate than the rate of industrial disputes.
Second, as table 3.3 shows, in many caSes, the minister has used the power
of his office to effectuate settlements, in some cases by convincing one
party to modify its demands, in the interest of keeping the peace. Since
manufacturing accounts for 41 percent of all disputes (see table 3.6), it
follows that the minister becomes involved in dispute settlements much
more in this sector.
Amendments to Collective Agreements. Malaysian labor law requires that
once an agreement is reached, it must be cognized-that is, submitted to
the Industrial Court-which then provides legal status to the agreement
by converting it to an award of the court. The Industrial Court has the
power either to reject a collective bargaining agreement or to suggest
modifications before cognizance, if the court determines that provisions of
the award are against the national interest. This provision limits good-
faith bargaining, since employers can agree to "excessive" wage demands
made by unions, knowing that "high wage costs" are likely to be deemed
as against the national interest and modified by the court.
Although this system existed under ISI, as noted earlier, since EOI, as
table 3.4 shows, there has been a steady increase in the number of
agreements that have been sent back to the parties for amendment before
cognizance was granted. In 1985, more than 50 percent of the agreements
were accepted only after amendments were added. Clearly, the Industrial
Court has been acting under the directions of the labor ministry. As
Arudsothy (1990) suggests, the Industrial Court has been operated virtu-
ally as an instrumentality of the Ministry of Labour. Any semblance of
r, and Pehie, Mansour, and Chen 1988.
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No. accepted
Total agreements without No. accepted
Year deposited amendments with amendments
1978 186 186 0
1979 204 204 0
1980 207 114 93 (44%)
1981 262 221 41 (15.5%)
1982 266 140 125 (46.4%)
1983 268 123 136 (50.7%)
1984 234 110 117 (50%)
1985 330 145 185 (56%)
Source:Sivagnanam 1988.
Tabid. 5. In-house Unions in Malaysia, 1984-88
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Toral 177 189 199 210 224
Percenrage of roral unions 49.3 51.2 52.5 51.3 54.5
Percentage of private
secror unions 28.2 32.5 36.1 36.7 38.2
Percentage of starurory
aurhoriry unions 94.8 95.1 95.1 95.1 96.6
Percentage of government
service unions 45.8 47.2 47.6 47.2 46.7
Source:Arudsothy and Littler 1993.
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independence was further removed in 1986, when the government decided
that the appointment of officers of the court would be left largely to the
discretion of the minister.
Enterprise or "In-House" Unions. Under the Trade Unions Ordinance of
1959, unions could be organized on an occupation-within-industry basis
and could affiliate themselves with national unions but could not have
national unions represent them for trade union purposes. Although this
policy was designed to keep unions small and responsive to the particular
conditions of their industries, it was also a system by wh'ich the labor
movement could be kept fragmented in ways that would threaten the
government politically (Arudsothy and Littler 1993).
Under Dr. Mahathir Mohammed's "Look East" policy, the successful
example of Japanese enterprise unions was introduced to Malaysian legisla-
tion, although in-house unions were in existence even before by means of
the registrar's decisions. 9 Table 3.5 shows the rapid growth in the number
of enterprise unions since the 1980s.
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In 1985-86, out of twenty-eight new unions registered, twenty-seven
were enterprise unions. In theory, enterprise unions organized on Japanese
lines produce more integrative labor-management relations since the goals
of the enterprise and the unions coalesce. It must be remembered, however,
that enterprise unions are only one feature of various interrelated polices in
Japan that make the industrial relations system successful. For instance,
long-term employment contracts, seniority-based pay systems, firm-spe-
cific training systems, and considerable labor-management consultation
reinforce the enterprise union system. In Malaysia, the concept of enterprise
unions alone is unlikely to result in the kind of stable and flexible
labor-management relations that the Japanese have and the Malaysian
government seems to want. The other ingredients, notably the acceptance
of unions as a partner in the business, are noticeably absent.
There are other contradictions in promoting enterprise unions. For
instance, if an enterprise union is to be successful, all employees in the
enterprise must become members. Under Malaysian law, however, various
classes of employees, including supervisors, secretaries, and security per-
sonnel, are not allowed to become members of a union. Further, there
are considerable restrictions on unions concerning the subject matter of
bargaining, and little or no participation in workplace decision making
exists. Given these conditions, the criticism that the legislation requiring
enterprise unions was enacted to keep the labor movement fragmented is
certainly plausible.
Policy on Labor Federations.The latter criticism is supported by the
government's unwillingness to consider forming one major labor federa-
tion. Attempts in 1985 to unify the two major federations, the Malaysian
Trade Union Congress and the Congress of Unions of Employees in the
Public and Civil Services (Malaysia) (CUEP ACS), failed since the registrar
of trade unions requested numerous changes in the proposed constitution
that the unions felt were impossible. Although this reflects the govern-
ment's desire to discourage the formation of a national union federation,
recent restrictions on trade union rights in the public sector have forced
some public sector unions to affiliate with the MTUC. Increased disillu-
sionment with its traditional leadership has prompted the promotion of a
rival national federation by the National Union of Newspaper Workers,
which is still unrecognized by the government. The government's determi-
nation to keep the labor movement fragmented is also evidenced by its
"behind-the-scenes" support of a rival labor federation-the Malaysian
Labour Organization (MLO)--sponsored by the Bank Employees' Union,
which currently has fifteen affiliated unions with 142,000 members (Arud-
sothy and Littler 1993).
The general tightening of labor relations laws and the suppression of
unionization and collective bargaining rights noted in the private sector
have had some spillover effects in the public sector. Arudsothy (1990)
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suggests that all sections of the public sector have progressively been
excluded from the provisions of parts of industrial relations legislation.
The right to strike in the public sector is largely illusionary, given the
inapplicability of Parts II-VI of the Industrial Relations Act and the
elaborate rules that effectively circumscribe the right to strike. There has,
in fact, been a shift to a more unitary and paternalistic system of industrial
relations in the public sector (Arudsothy and Littler 1993).
In sum, as these examples demonstrate, the state's role as an employer
and its dependence on foreign investment for its manufacturing base,
particularly in the electronics industry, has created a labor relations system
that is repressive and dominated by the government. The shift from ISI to
EOI was the primary catalyst for the tightening of labor relations policies.
The specific cost-containment policies were determined by the government
in response to presstlre from foreign companies on which it waS so
dependent. The involvement of the government in industrialization also
appears to have been important. The federal government is now involved
in industrial relations in many different ways: as a sponsor of IR legislation;
as an administrator ofIR legislation; as a third party in dispute settlements;
as an employer in the public sector; and as a stakeholder in various private
corporations (Ayadurai 1990).
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The changes in state industrial relations policy in Malaysia have led to
several important outcomes. These are discussed below. It is worth noting
that the impact of these changes tends to be reflected primarily in the
industrial sector. Other sectors of the economy, such as the plantation
sector, where there has been a longer history of bargaining and there have
been well-entrenched unions, remain relatively unaffected. Nevertheless,
in the context of a rapidly industrializing economy, it is the manufacturing
sector that sets industrial relations trends; hence, the focus on this sector.
Structural and Institutional Consequences
State labor policies have left Malaysian unions weak and fragmented at
the national level. Union density, defined as the percentage of the total
work force that is unionized, declined from 11. 2 percent in 1985 to about
9.4 percent in 1990. Measured as a percentage of the nonagricultural work
force, union density is about 17 percent. Much of this decline can be
attributed to state policy and employer opposition (Arudsothy and Littler
1993). In the manufacturing sector, the largest and fastest-growing sector
of the economy in terms of employment and contribution to GDP, union
density is less than 11 percent. In the plantation sector, where there has
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been relatively less government intervention, the figure is 46 percent
(AtUdsothy 1991).
Unions remain fragmented and small, resulting in organizational and
financial weaknesses that limit their ability to organize effectively and to
represent their members (Arudsothy and Littler 1993). Although central
union federations exist, such as the MTUC, CUEPACS, and the govern-
ment-supported MLO, their effectiveness is limited, given that they cannot
involve themselves in collective bargaining or unionlike activities since
they are incorporated as societies. Moreover, there is little unity among
these organizations, thus limiting their ability to mobilize the work force.
The wide-ranging powers given to the registrar of trade unions and to the
labor minister further serve to contain union action.
Bargaining in the private sector tends to be decentralized, so that there
are a variety of different bargaining structures (Arudsothy and Littler 1993)
and little evidence of pattern bargaining. By and large, bargaining power
rests with the employers, given the limitations on the ability of unions to
strike. Collective bargaining agreements are in force for a legislatively
mandated period of three years, thus limiting the ability of firms to
respond quickly to changes in the economic environment (Ayadurai 1990).
The wage system also exhibits a number of institutional rigidities, such as
predetermined automatic annual adjustments and nonadjustable contrac-
tual bonuses, and wages are linked to seniority (Salih 1988).
Although dispute settlement is effective in terms of the success of
conciliation, the limitation on the subjects that can De raised as disputes
(by virtue of the restricted scope of bargaining) makes the effectiveness of
conciliation less certain. The number of strikes in Malaysia has been
steadily declining, as can be seen from table 3.6.
Although administrative procedures limit the freedom to strike, this
does not mean that there is little conflict in the system. Rather, the
limitations on strikes tend to increase the dependence on third-party
dispute resolution, having a so-called narcotic effect. The number of strikes
has declined, but the number of disputes has been increasing steadily,
indicating substantial conflict in the system. Relevant data are provided in
tables 3.6 and 3.7.
The rise in disputes has been mostly in manufacturing. This sector
accounted for the majority of disputes-41 percent-in 1986. The correla-
tion between the number of strikes and the number of disputes is negative
at .45 (p < .05), suggesting that the restrictions on striking do result in
increased conflict through more disputes and thereby control the level of
unionism. Although unionization increased by only 1 or 2 percentage
points over the period 1981-86, the number of disputes doubled. The
increase in the number of disputes, therefore, is evidence of the weakness
of Malaysian unions and the consequent reliance on third-party dispute
resolution mechanisms.
Table 3.6. Number of Unions, Strikes, and Disputes in Malaysia, 1981-89
Unions Disputes Strikes
1981 498 24
1982 383 606 26
1983 386 834 24
1984 386 757 17
1985 392 827 22 .
1986 401 1123 23
1987 409 100.1 20
1988 39'8 989 9
1989 322 7
Table3. 7. Distribution of Disputes in Malaysia, by Industry, 1983-86
Industry 1983 1984 1985 1986
Manufacturing 296 270 388 468
(Percent) (35.8) (37.3) (45.0) (41.67)
Plantation 276 212 191 232
Transport 128 127 147 218
Services 65 66 65 104
Commerce 36 26 40 43
Other 25 21 31 58
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Limitations on the subject matter of bargaining, state intervention to
prevent or contain strikes, and the weakness of trade unions result in an
industrial relations system in which the unions are extremely dependent
on third-party intervention. Such involvement by the government inhibits
the development of a pluralistic system characterized by free collective
bargaining. It can be argued that the system does not create the climate
under which unions and managements can develop collaborative relation-
ships, based on their bargaining strength, necessary for mutual problem
solving. Evidence of New Industria.
Human Resource Practices
Industrial Relations Practices of Firms
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The antiunion stance of the Malaysian government complements the
antiunion stance of Malaysian employers. Employer opposition to unions
is widespread. P. Arudsothy and C. Littler (1993) note that union busting
and other antiunion activities increased during the 1980s relative to the
1970s. Indigenous companies appear far more inclined to be antiunion
than foreign-owned concerns, although union avoidance appears to be the
dominant strategy in export-oriented manufacturing and electronics.
Despite the government's announcement that unions could be formed in
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the electronics industry, only one enterprise union has been established. E.
Grace (1990) suggests three reasons for this phenomenon. The first reason
is that the workers view enterprise unions with skepticism and mistrust;
the second is that they fear employer reprisals if they join a union; and the
third is that it has become clear to workers that examples of unionization
drives in other companies result in increases in wages and benefits in their
own (i.e., a union substitution effect).
Employers clearly use both union suppression and union substitution
strategies in dealing with workers. Motorola, for example, increased its
workers' pay and benefits one month after the government's announcement
that unions could be formed in the electronics industry (Grace 1990). The
owner of one U.S. electronics factory offered a box of Kentucky Fried
Chicken to any worker willing to disclose the name of persons signing a
union membership application. Another U.S. corporation invited a Muslim
religious instructor to speak during working hours about why it was
against the Islamic faith for women to become members of a union.
Motorola, Matsushita, and many other companies have threatened to
move operations to Thailand and China if a union was formed. Workers in
these companies who have exhibited pro-union sentiments have roUtinely
been transferred to other plants and intimidated.
In June 1990, Hitachi's Malaysian subsidiary fired 1,003 striking
workers after they walked oUt in protest of the government's refusal to
allow their in-house union to be represented by a national electrical
workers union. Although most of the workers were hired back after they
apologized, workers who were considered activists were not reinstated.
Although Hitachi clearly was within the law in this case, its unwillingness
to reinstate the activists suggests the company's antagonism toward unions,
a view shared by many American and Japanese employers. Clearly, al-
though unions are weak as a result of government policy, they are further
weakened by employer policies and by the interaction of government and
employer policies.
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hat unions could be formed in
Despite the intense avoidance of unions in Malaysia, leaders of plant-
level industrial relations, particularly in the modern bellwether electronics
sector, are gradually moving toward practices followed in similar industries
in more advanced countries, such as Germany, Japan, and the United
States. Changes in the production processes in the electronics industry, for
example, have brought about changes in industrial relations practices. In
the early 1980s, by and large, the production system was driven by
"Fordist" methods, characterized by assembly-line systems in which work-
ers did highly specialized and repetitiv~ tasks requiring minimal skill and
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training. Wages above the daily base rate were based on a variety of piece
rates and production incentive systems (Rasiah 1988; Grace 1990).
Given the effect of two recessions, however, there has been considerable
restructuring of the production processes in an effort to increase efficiency.
The industry is being increasingly automated, and new manufacturing
systems, such as just in time, total quality management, and materials
requisition planning (MRP), have been introduced in many plants. These
new systems have brought with them new methods of training and
remuneration systems. Increasingly, wages are tied to learning new skills.
R. Rasiah (1988) notes that in many companies a production worker needs
to know at least three processes to become a super-operator with a salary of
almost M$750 a month (approximately U.S.$300). The team concept in
production has been introduced in many U.S.-owned plants, giving
workers more and more inpur into the manufacturing process and in many
cases resulting in more efficient production and lower employee turnover.
Texas Instruments, for example, has had exemplary success with the
introduction of self-managed teams for production and quality control
(Arensman 1991). Turnover rates have declined to 3 percent, and 85
percent of the employees have been in their jobs for more than five years.
This contrasts with the electronics industry more generally, where labor
turnover reached about 35 percent in 1985-86. There is still no job
security, however, even for regular production staff.
In other parts of the economy, there are isolated examples of the
emergence of new industrial relations ptactices, based on the acceptance of
trade unions and employee involvement. For instance, since the 1979
strike at Malaysian Airlines, industrial relations have become stable and
unions have become somewhat involved in decision making. Joint consulta-
tive committees, composed of union-management representatives, decide
on grievances and quality issues, and turnover has declined to less than
3 percent. In a manufacturing organization (Seng and Hashim 1987),
management meets once a month with the area union committee to resolve
issues, and the managing director meets with union representatives on a
regular basis. Employee involvement has been increasing since the intro-
duction of self-managed teams for quality control and production improve-
ment, and employee suggestions have increased dramatically, to an average
of 17.2 per employee in 1988. The banking sector has also undergone
changes, including increased employee participation, and an "interrela-
tions" committee, composed of union and management representatives,
meets periodically to resolve industrial relations issues and to plan produc-
tion (Arul, Saidin, and Abu 1987).
There are several motivations for these new practices. In the state-owned
enterprises, there is a gradual realization that productivity enhancements
require the active participation of the workers. In other companies, the
shift to more employee patticipation may be driven by competition,
changes in technology, and t
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changes in technology, and the need for increased flexibility. At the same
time, it is also possible that this shift to the institution of more human
resource management techniques reflects a desire for more sophisticated
forms of labor control.
It is difficult to conclude that these changes represent a clear trend,
however. To reach such a conclusion would require a comprehensive survey
of industrial relations practices. A key question here is the extent to which
these new forms of human resource management will be successful in the
absence of other policies that appear essential to the creation of stable and
flexible industrial relations systems, such as increased job security, in-
creased training to prepare workers to participate more actively in decision
making, and more cooperative labor-management relations (Katz, Kuru-
villa, and Turner forthcoming).
Future Issues
, practices. In the state-owned
it productivity enhancements
:ers. In other companies, the
be driven by competition,
Assuming that the process of export-oriented industrialization follows
the standard pattern in the region (i.e., simple EOI to more advanced
EO!) (Bjorkman, Lauridsen, and Marcussen 1988), the current labor policy
articulated by the Malaysian government may result in some future
dysfunction. First, Malaysia's competitive advantage, based on its low
labor costs, is likely to be eroded given the competition from the
Philippines, Thailand, China, and Vietnam. A key issue is whether
Malaysia can make the investments necessary to increase its workers'
skills through education, training, and labor market policies and thereby
upgrade its industries and attract more high-technology investment.
Second, the rapid technological changes occurring in the electronics
seCtor require changes in the method of labor utilization. Rapid technologi-
cal change to more high-cost, high-skill, capital-intensive methods of
production may induce foreign investors to relocate to their own "high-
skilUhigh-cost" countries or to Malaysia's competitors (e.g., Singapore)
unless Malaysia can provide the kind of work force the foreign investors
need.
These changes have several implications for industrial relations practice.
First, they require the creation of a well-educated and highly trained work
force that is capable of participating in production decisions characteristic
of the new post-Fordist production methods. Second, to develop such a
work force requires personnel policies, such as increased job security,
training, wage systems, joint problem solving, and cooperative labor-
management relationships, that enhance participation and knowledge
acquisition, Third, these changes are not possible unless state and employer
labor policy become less repressive and more collaborative. More funda-
.mental changes, therefore, appear necessary.
Current evidence suggests that such changes are indeed occurring
" "'.'
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(Kuruvilla 1994). Already, investment incentives have been restructured to
attract higher technology-based investments, and the Malaysian education
system has been deregulated, resulting in a mushrooming of private
colleges with exchange arrangements with universities in Australia and
Canada. This should lead to an increase in the supply of qualified workers
for higher-technology industries. In addition, the government enacted the
Human Resources Development Act of 1992, which instituted the Skills
Development Fund. The law forces larger enterprises to pay a certain
percentage of their payroll costs into the fund, to which the government
contributes a matching sum. The funds are used to subsidize the training
costs of all firms that apply for funds. Immigration policies have also been
restructured to permit the import of both skilled and unskilled guest
workers to meet the demands of industry.
Clearly, the focus of government policy has shifted from cost contain-
ment and involvement toward skills development. In addition, in the
heavy industries sector, there is an increased focus on labor-management
cooperation. Policies oriented toward skills development at the national
level are complemented by employer approaches emphasizing increased
worker involvement. The movement in the electronics industry is toward
increasingly positive human resource management in a nonunion envi-
ronment.
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It would appear that the ISI strategy was associated with an industrial
relations policy that was, in some sense, pluralistic. With the shift to EOI,
however, the government labor policy essentially became repressive and
exclusionary. The motivation for this repressive policy stemmed from the
demands of the EOI strategy (for a low-cost, labor-intensive strategy) to
attract foreign investment. There is some evidence that foreign manufactur-
ers did exert some pressure on the Malaysian government to contain costs.
The mechanisms by which repressive state policies were enacted included
various changes in the industrial relations rules and increased government
involvement in the industrial relations sphere.
This chapter has a number of limitations that deserve mention. First, it
is implicitly assumed that the restrictions on trade union rights in Malaysia
favor employers in all sectors in the same way. This may not be true,
particularly with respect to the plantation sector.
Second, this chapter did not address variations in the abilities and
strategies trade unions have used to counter and mobilize against govern-
ment and employer policies. The focus has been on the export-oriented
manufacturing sector, where unions are exceptionally weak, because this
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Third, it would be useful to disentangle further employers' motivations
to change their industrial relations practices. On the one hand, employers
following an antiunion strategy may be motivated entirely by cost consider-
ations. On the other hand, the recent move toward cooperation and worker
involvement may represent a movement tOward more sophisticated forms
of worker control through "corporatist" practices. It is also possible that
the movement toward cooperation may be due to changes in production
technologies that require greater levels of worker involvement.
From a comparative industrial relations research standpoint, this chapter
raises several questions regarding the explanatOry role of industrialization
policies in affecting industrial relations policy. Are certain types of indus-
trialization strategies associated with certain types of IR systems? Are there
variations within an industrialization strategy that have implications for
different lR policies? What i~ clear from the evidence is that a shift in
industrialization strategy has an effect on an industrial relations system.
(This conclusion appears supported by more recent comparative investiga-
tions in Singapore and the Philippines [Kuruvilla 1994, 1995}). Future
researchers may wish to consider these issues in more detail.
Implicit in this case is the notion that the shift from one industrial
strategy to another represents a discrete moment in the transition of
economies and industrial relations systems. History shows that there are
key moments of transition in industrial relations systems, after which they
get set and are hard to modify. Often these key moments are a result of
legislative changes (e.g., the National Labor Relations Act in the United
States) or other economic junctUres (e.g., postwar reconstruction in Ger-
many and Japan) or historical factors (e.g., independence movements in
the Third World). Recent policy prescriptions forcing Third World coun-
tries to liberalize their economies to integrate into the world market (e.g. ,
India) require changes in industrialization strategies that provide yet
another moment in transition for industrial relations systems. For those
interested in the transformation of industrial relations systems in Third
World countries, focusing on the shifts in industrialization strategy may
be a particularly useful starting point for study.
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